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Refusal of Surgery in Mitigation of Damages
Eileen Kelley *
G ENERALLY WHERE ONE HAS BEEN INJURED by another's wrong-
ful conduct he is required to exercise ordinary care and
reasonable prudence to seek medical treatment so as to mini-
mize the defendant's damages. Failure to do so may diminish
the amount of damages the injured person may recover. This is a
fundamental principle of the law of damages, and not of tort.'
Reasonableness of Refusal
The questions which frequently plague the court are: what
constitutes reasonableness, and when may a reasonably prudent
man refuse to submit to medical or surgical treatment? A Wis-
consin court2 held that there is no duty to submit to corrective
surgery. Consideration of such a possibility is only for purposes
of assessing the damages for permanent injury. A jury charge
by an Ohio court 3 stated that the injured party could proceed
upon his own judgment in seeking medical treatment and is not
bound to satisfy that of another. The court in Butler v. Whit-
man4 stated that one need not submit to an operation, but may
choose to bear the affliction and was entitled to damages.
In Williams v. City of Brooklyn' the plaintiff was not re-
quired to submit "blindly" to professional advice but was en-
titled and bound to exercise reasonable judgment. If his con-
duct in refusing to submit to surgery was that of a reasonably
prudent man he should not be charged with negligence. Here
plaintiff had fallen on a defective sidewalk and refused to under-
go an operation for a hernia, though later admitting that his re-
fusal had been a mistake.
A recent Pennsylvania decision6 held that the court had
*B.A., M. A., in Psychology, Bowling Green State University (Ohio),
Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property, Sec. 101, pp. 125-126 (1961
revision).
2 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N. W. 2d 393 (1960).
3 City of Toledo v. Radbone, 3 Ohio C. C. R. (n.s.) 382, aff'd, 68 Ohio St.
687, 70 N. E. 1117 (1901).
4 193 Minn. 150, 258 N. W. 165 (1934).
5 33 App. Div. 539, 53 N. Y. S. 1007, 1009 (1898).
6 Bartunek v. Koch, ____ Pa -.. , 170 A. 2d 563 (1961).
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properly charged the jury that if it believed the plaintiff knew
his condition could be relieved by surgery, and that an or-
dinarily prudent man would undergo such an operation, such
facts must be considered as elements reducing damages.
Whether a man acted reasonably is a question of fact.7 The
efforts which the injured person must make need only be reason-
able under the particular circumstances.8 One court 9 attempted
to establish as a test for reasonableness in refusing to submit to
surgery, not a willingness to do so but the injured party's right
to guard life and limb from unreasonable peril.
The injured person's right to avoid, if he chooses, surgery
which involves peril of life, however slight, anguish and undue
risks to health that extend beyond the bounds of reason emerges
as the exception to the general rule.10 A refusal is unreasonable
if the proposed surgery is free from danger to life, extraordinary
suffering and offers a reasonable prospect of restoration or re-
lief, supported by expert medical opinion.
The risks to one's life and the probability of success of the
recommended surgery are major factors in determining whether
a refusal is justified. In Jones v. Eppler" the plaintiff refused
major surgery for back, leg and arm injuries because of possible
fatal results, although his condition would have been greatly
improved should the operation prove successful. The court held
that he need not submit to surgery which might be attended
with some risk of failure or death, and the plaintiff must be per-
mitted to exercise his liberty of choice. The refusal could not be
considered in mitigation of damages. This was the court's first
opportunity to apply the rule to a personal injury case, but it
noted that in an earlier holding the State Industrial Commission
lacked jurisdiction to order an employee to submit to major
surgery.12
The chances of the operating table are too grave to require
the plaintiff to submit to a major operation to lessen her dam-
7 Budden v. Goldstein, 43 N. J. Super. 340, 128 A. 2d 730 (1957); Robinson
v. Jackson, 116 N. J. L. 476, 184 At. 811, (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) 105 A. L. R.
1466; Thompson v. Quarles, 297 S. W. 2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
s Cline v. City of St. Joseph, 245 S. W. 2d 695 (Mo. App. 1952); Thompson
v. Quarles, supra, n. 7.
9 Neault v. Parker-Young Co., 86 N. H. 231, 166 Atl. 289 (1933).
10 Budden v. Goldstein, supra, n. 7 at 736.
11 ---- Okla ... 266 P. 2d 451, (1953), 48 A. L. R. 2d 333.
12 Accord, Williams Theatres Inc. v. Mickle, 201 Okla. 279, 205 P. 2d 513
(1949).
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age, and the decision is solely hers, reasoned a Minnesota court.13
Neither a court nor a jury should pass on the wisdom of her
choice.
Gibbs v. Almstrom1 4 held that the damages were not ex-
cessive although plaintiff refused surgery which might have cur-
ed complications arising from a broken nose. Recognizing that
the plaintiff has a duty to minimize damages, the court said
* . no man is required to risk his life upon the operating table
for any such purpose." (Emphasis added.)
In McNally v. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co.15 the court said,
"Although the peril of life seems to be very slight, never-
theless the idea is appalling to one's conscience that a human
being should be compelled to take a risk of death, however
slight that may be, in order that the pecuniary obligations
created by law in his favor against his employer may be
minimized."
The chances of success in the McNally case were substantial and
proof had been offered that only forty-eight out of twenty-three
thousand cases had been unsuccessful.
The case of Overton v. City and County of Denver 1 presents
a situation which appears to be contra to the general holdings
that the slightest risk need not be undertaken. Here, a fireman's
pre-existing goiter condition was aggravated while fighting a
fire. Medical witnesses testified that the chances of survival
were at least eighty-five per cent if the goiter was removed. The
order for suspension of further compensation payments until the
operation was performed was upheld even though it was major
surgery and plaintiff's own physician advised against it.
An exploratory operation on the skull, which had not more
than a five per cent mortality rate, and in which plaintiff's con-
dition might become worse if not performed, was reasonably
refused.1 7 An Illinois court' s upheld a plaintiff's refusal to sub-
mit to surgery because of the uncertainty of results, although an
13 Maroney v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 123 Minn. 480, 144 N. W.
149 (1913), 49 L. R. A. (n. s.) 756.
14 145 Minn. 35, 176 N. W. 173, 174 (1920).
15 87 N. J. L. 455, 95 Atl. 122, 123 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 88 N. J. L. 729, 96
Atl. 293 (Ct. Err. & App. 1916).
16 106 Colo. 114, 102 P. 2d 474 (1940).
17 Karberg v. Southern Pacific Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 234, 52 P. 2d 285 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935).
18 Howard v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co., 13 Ill. App. 2d 482, 142 N. E. 2d
825 (1957).
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orthopedic surgeon expressed "hope" that the proposed opera-
tion for back injuries might alleviate the pain and thought "it
was worth a try."
Fear of the recommended dangerous operation has been held
a proper basis for refusal. 19 In one situation the plaintiff feared
surgery for a herniated intervertebral disc which, if performed,
would eliminate his twenty-five per cent disability or would
leave residual effects of not more than five per cent. He had
known of two others who became paralyzed as a result of a
similar operation. The plaintiff agreed that the physicians (who
unanimously recommended surgery) knew more about it than
he, but the plaintiff aptly summed up the feeling of all injured
persons when he said, "it ain't their back." 20
Use of a general anesthesia has been cited in several cases
as factors considered when deciding that the complainant has not
unreasonably refused major surgery.21 But where only a local
anesthetic was required for surgical correction of a hernia, and
thus there was not any danger to life, plaintiff was denied
compensation because he refused. 22 However in 1960 a Pennsyl-
vania case 23 held that a seventy-year-old woman had a duty to
minimize damages by submitting to treatment requiring a gen-
eral anesthetic. The treatment involved only manipulations of
the arm to break up adhesions. It was reasoned that the "gen-
eral and widespread use of general anesthetics is such that a
willingness to suffer rather than submit to treatment seems un-
reasonable no matter how sincere plaintiff's fear may be." The
court surmised that either the jury believed plaintiff's refusal
was unreasonable or that her pain and disability were not as
annoying to her as it might have otherwise appeared.
Where an operation is a minor one and unattended by any
risks, the injured party is required to submit to surgery or his
damages will be lessened.24 In Leitzell v. Delaware L. & W. R.
19 Edwards v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 304 S. W. 2d 489 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1957), 25
Tenn. L. Rev. 405 (1958); Williams Theatres Inc. v. Mickle, supra, n. 12.
20 Walker v. International Paper Co., 230 Miss. 95, 92 So. 2d 445 (1957).
21 Thompson v. Quarles, supra, n. 7; Jones v. Eppler, supra, n. 11.
22 O'Brien v. Albrecht Co., 206 Mich. 101, 172 N. W. 601 (1919), 6 A. L. R.
1257.
23 Hilscher v. Ickinger, 194 Pa. Super. 237, 166 A. 2d 678 (1960), Appli-
cation for Allocation granted and appeal allowed, Feb. 27, 1961.
24 Goodwin v. Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103, 167 AtI. 87 (1933); Joliet Motor
Co. v. Industrial Board, 280 IlM. 148, 117 N. E. 423 (1917); Jenkins v.
American Automobile Ins. Co., 117 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1959).
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Co. 25 the court held that plaintiff need not undergo surgery, but
if the effect of his refusal would be to retain permanently a con-
dition which might be relieved by a simple operation which a
prudent man would undergo, then this should be considered by
the jury in assessing damages. "No compensation should be al-
lowed for damages that might reasonably be averted." 26
In Evans v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company 7 the
court searched the record and was unable to find any case in-
volving surgery for removal of a herniated vertebra in which
the injured workman's refusal to submit to corrective surgery
was permitted to reduce the amount of his award.
However, it appears that not all serious major operations
where the benefits to be derived are problematical may be re-
fused. In Hays v. Industrial Commission28 three physicians testi-
fied that the plaintiff's disability resulting from a herniated inter-
vertebral disc would be reduced to about ten per cent as a work-
ing unit, and the successfulness of such operations was from
fifty to eighty-five per cent. Without surgery the claimant would
suffer an eighty-five to one hundred per cent disability. The
Colorado supreme court upheld the Commission's decision that
if the claimant exercised his option to refuse, he could not re-
ceive full compensation for the balance of his life. The Com-
mission reasoned that "the contemplated surgery is now a com-
mon practice and the skill of those in the field is readily ap-
parent from the large percentage of successful results." The
court said that even if the operation did not yield favorable re-
sults, the claimant could be no worse off, because one cannot
be more than one hundred per cent totally disabled. It appears
that the risk of death from the surgery was not considered by
the court or the Commission.
Conflicting Medical Testimony
Generally the complainant may justifiably refuse surgery
where medical experts differ as to its probable success in effect-
ing a cure.29 A New York court" said, "Disagreements among
25 232 Pa. 475, 81 Atl. 543, (1911), 48 L. R. A. (n. s.) 114.
26 Ibid.
27 253 F. 2d 383 (C. A. New Mex. 1958), see 4 Oleck, Neg. & Comp. Ser. 7
(No. 1) Oct. 1, '58.
28 138 Colo. 334, 333 P. 2d 617 (1958).
29 Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 182 Cal. 93, 183 P. 2d 1,
(1920).
30 Bordanaro v. Burstiner, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 450, 453 (Tr. T. 1956).
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doctors frequently occur about results to be expected. He [plain-
tiff] need not serve as a guinea pig."
The testimony of two plastic surgeons differed as to the
probability of successfully making scars less conspicuous. One
would not guarantee results but said that he had performed a
number of similar operations with success, but plaintiff's phy-
sician doubted the advisability of the operation on the basis that
the scars might become worse. The higher court held proper
instructions to the jury that if there is a difference in expert
opinion as to the advisability and results of operations, there is
no duty to submit to surgery and failure to do so is not unreason-
able.31
Failure and Delay to Obtain Medical Care
When an injured person has failed to obtain medical treat-
ment when he reasonably should have, his failure becomes a
mitigating factor in assessing damages. "If an injured person
neglects to take care of himself, the consequences are his own
affair and he harmed only himself. No others' rights have been
abused." 32
Plaintiff in Gardner v. Sumner23 became ill from drinking
root beer containing foreign matter. The court held that his
failure to consult a physician, either by telephone or in person,
would not materially affect the monetary award, but would go
to the "bona fides" of his claimed illness, to be considered by a
jury.
The evidence was conflicting as to whether plaintiff had
consulted a physician in Devou v. Searles.3 4 He had sustained
what at first appeared to be a minor hand injury, but which
subsequently became worse. A request for a jury charge was
refused which stated that defendant would not be responsible
if the jury found that a reasonably prudent man would have
consulted a physician under the same circumstances. The court
said such a charge was inconsistent with an earlier holding3 5 that
a person need only proceed on his own judgment and not satisfy
that of another. A mistake would not bar recovery.
31 Ouillette v. Sheerin, 297 Mass. 536, 9 N. E. 2d 713 (1937).
32 Supra, n. 9 at 290.
33 40 Ala. App. 340, 113 So. 2d 523 (1959).
34 Devou v. Searles, 12 Ohio App. 329 (1920).
35 Supra, n. 3 at 384.
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A new trial was ordered upon failure to charge the jury
that plaintiff could not recover for aggravation of his injuries
where he failed to seek medical care until several days after
sustaining the injury, and evidence showed that part of the in-
jury could have been quickly cured at small cost and without
danger by proper treatment.3 6
Varicose veins developed when plaintiff failed to use his
best judgment immediately in Murphy v. Southern Pacific Co.37
Instead he gave the injury such medical treatment necessary at
the time. The medical witnesses differed as to what caused
varicosity of veins. The court commented that where expert
opinion could not agree as to the origin, "it would be more than
a presumption to expect a common layman to believe that from
a contusion the serious consequences of which he is now suf-
fering could follow." 3s
An award of $2,000 was considered excessive and reduced
by $500 in Carr v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. 39 because
plaintiff failed to consult a specialist upon the attending physi-
cian's advice, although the latter felt there were no serious
residual effects from the accident.
The general rule applying to refusal to submit to hazardous
treatment was recognized by a Wisconsin court4" but it rejected
plaintiff's appeal for gross inadequacy of award because she did
not seek treatment until three days following the accident. She
had been advised to do so at once. After consulting with a doc-
tor she did not follow his prescribed treatment nor would she
be hospitalized for a thorough examination. The recommended
treatment did not involve any hazards. The court further stated
that not only is plaintiff "obliged to exercise reasonable care...
This obligation included the seeking of medical care as well as
the following of the advice of the physician consulted. .. ."
Delay in obtaining treatment did not preclude an injured
person from recovery when she developed serious back and
spine injuries from what at first appeared to be a mere wrenched
leg and it did not appear that the delay aggravated the injury.41
36 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. White, 101 Fed. 928 (5th Cir. 1900), 62 L. R. A.
90.
37 31 Nev. 120, 101 Pac. 322 (1909).
38 Id. at 328.
39 124 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 1960).
40 Collova v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 535, 99 N. W. 2d
740, 743 (1959).
41 Hamelin v. Foulkes, 105 Cal. App. 458, 287 Pac. 526 (1930).
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Suit was brought against defendant-physician in Dobbs v.
Stellar 42 for his negligent use of a fluoroscope when examining
plaintiff's hand. Plaintiff did not undergo the recommended am-
putation promptly nor would he submit to an incision being
made. Subsequently the amputation was performed, but there
was some conflicting testimony that if the amputation had been
performed when first suggested, it would have effected a speedier
cure. The jury was instructed that if plaintiff exercised reason-
able diligence and means to prevent its aggravation, he was not
obligated to undergo surgery promptly when advised by his doc-
tor solely to minimize the defendant's damages.
Selection of Physician
Ordinary care and reasonable judgment need only be exer-
cised in selecting a physician or surgeon. Loesser v. Humphrey
43
held that it was not error to include in the jury charge that
plaintiff may still recover damages if he selected a physician of
good standing and reputation, although such physician may not
have used the most appropriate or best remedies in caring for
the injuries. The plaintiff was not bound to call upon the most
eminent or distinguished physician before defendant would be
held liable.
One case44 held that it was not a defense that the surgeon
was not skilled or failed to give the best or proper treatment,
so long as the plaintiff followed the physician's treatment, and
he had been selected with ordinary care. A similar holding was
found in an Ohio case 45 where the trial court erroneously
charged the jury that the complainant's increased pain might
have been a result of improper treatment.
The Boa46 case further held it was error to admit evidence
of improper medical treatment where there is no evidence show-
ing that plaintiff had knowledge of the physician's want of skill
or that she continued his services after learning the facts.
The tort-feasor becomes liable, therefore, for all conse-
quences naturally flowing from his wrongful conduct, and this
includes those results where the physician's negligence has ag-
42 77 Cal. App. 2d 411, 175 P. 2d 607 (1946).
43 41 Ohio St. 378 (1884).
44 SupTa, n. 29.
45 Heintz v. Caldwell, 16 Ohio C. C. R. 630 (1898).
46 Supya, n. 29 and 44.
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gravated the original injury.47 Proximate causation is the basis
of the liability.
The courts refuse to interfere in a patient's selection of which
physician's advice to follow. A Kentucky court 48 tersely com-
mented that the patient must be accorded a certain discretion
in his selection of doctors whose advice he wishes to heed. The
courts will not require that a person follow one doctor's recom-
mendation in preference to another, especially when the latter
is a physician selected by the opposition. The court implied that
it might make the selection if it is shown that the complainant's
own choice is that of an unskilled physician or if he refused to
make a choice. In the case at bar, several of the defendant's ex-
pert medical witnesses testified that the recommended surgery
was not hazardous, but claimant's own physician and one of de-
fendant's doctors did not recommend the operation. Claimant's
refusal, held to be reasonable under these circumstances, was
based on his physician's opinion that the surgery might bring
more serious results than those suffered from the original in-
jury.
Costs and Expenses
The medical expenses incurred in surgery necessary or
recommended because of defendant's negligence would ordinarily
constitute an element of damages recoverable from the tort-
feasor.49 However, the factor of expenses involved in obtaining
such services has been considered in determining whether plain-
tiff acted in a reasonable manner. In Ledbetter v. Hammond
Milk Corp.50 a private physician's claim had been denied by
the trial court, which said that plaintiff, an indigent Negro, could
have obtained treatment at a nearby charity hospital. Reversing
this decision, the appellate court commented that neither law
nor equity showed reason why an individual could not incur just
debts from private treatment, although he may be unemployed
or impecunious. "We cannot decide where a patient should have
received treatment for injuries after the treatment has been
made." 51
47 Seymour v. Carroll, 43 Ohio App. 60, 28 Ohio N. P. (n. s.) 491 (1932).
48 Kentucky-Jellico Coal v. Lee, 289 Ky. 81, 158 S. W. 2d 385 (1942).
49 15 Am. Jur. Damages, Sec. 71.
50 126 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1961).
51 Id. at 663.
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In Sette v. Dakis5 2 the court disallowed plaintiff's expendi-
tures for treatment incurred after he had been advised to under-
go surgery. Had he submitted to an operation, the need for the
treatment would have been obviated. The expenses of such an
operation and the costs entailed for the six weeks' disability
were allowed, however.
A Louisiana court 53 held that plaintiff's damages could be
minimized because she refused surgery, perhaps because of lack
of funds. The court noted that such surgery could have been
performed at a local charity hospital without expense.
In Carney v. Scott 54 the plaintiff left the hospital only be-
cause he was being harassed for payment he was unable to
make. A physician put a cast on his leg and assisted the plaintiff
in his exit. The court held that he could not be charged with a
lack of ordinary care in so doing.
The court reasoned in Maroney v. Minneapolis and St. Louis
Ry. Co. 55 that the cost of an operation was not evidence with
which to measure the plaintiff's damages. The question appeared
to revolve around plaintiff's refusal to submit to major surgery,
and the court felt that its cost ($200) should not be a material
element in assessing damages in the amount of $1,900. The
reasoning was based on the risks involved in the surgery and
that plaintiff was the sole person to decide whether to submit
to a hazardous operation.
The cost of simple, minor surgery was a mitigating factor
where a scar could, with probable success, be reduced to a very
fine linear one.56 The court felt that a reduction of $1,000 was
not unreasonable when the operation cost only $200.
Damages were denied in Owens v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.
Co.5 7 because plaintiff, in refusing to abstain from work upon
doctor's orders, aggravated his injury. The court held that
".... he is entitled to recover to the extent of the damages with-
out his fault, but not that portion caused by his subsequent
acts."
52 133 Conn. 55, 48 A. 2d 271 (1946).
53 Donovan v. New Orleans R. & Light Co., 132 La. 239, 61 So. 216 (1930),
48 L. R. A. (n. s.) 109.
54 325 S. W. 2d 343 (Sup. Ct. Ky. 1959).
55 Supra, n. 13 at 150.
56 Goodwin v. Giovenelli, supra, n. 24 at 89.
57 35 Fed. 715 (Cir. Ct. S. D. Ohio 1888).
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Summary
The reasonableness of the ordinarily prudent man appears
to be the standard used when an injured person is confronted
with the dilemma of whether to submit to surgery. He may con-
sider the probability of success and the risks to his life, and his
choice of physician need only be made using ordinary care and
reasonable judgment. What is reasonable is a question of fact
and depends on the particular circumstances. If medical opinion
conflicts, this is a justifiable basis for refusal to have the con-
templated surgery. Operations deemed to be major generally
may properly be refused.
A plaintiff must not aggravate his injuries by any lack of
proper care or failure to seek treatment. The courts will only
award damages for those injuries which are not a result of the
plaintiff's negligent conduct.
It has been questioned5 8 that the exception of not having
to submit to major surgery tends to abrogate the standard of
reasonableness and may be too simple a solution. It is sub-
stituting a fixed, arbitrary rule in the place of one allowing
flexibility when determining a man's reasonableness in a situa-
tion. Can it not be conceived that a reasonably prudent man
might choose to undergo a dangerous and serious operation in
some instances, especially when the prognosis is a deterioration
in bodily functioning without such surgery?
The Hays case may offer an indication of a change in think-
ing. Up to that time, major surgery involving the back could be
properly refused, but this Court held that a refusal was im-
proper, due to the skill and advancement of medical science.
The Hilscher case in Pennsylvania holds substantially the same
for the use of general anesthetia. Are these "outlandish" cases
and contra to the "well-established" rule of law, or is this line
of reasoning providing the defendant with a new trend and tac-
tic with which to minimize his pecuniary obligations?
58 Workman's Compensation-Refusal of Operation, 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 405
(1958).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
